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Abstract
Stochastic control problems related to optimal advertising under uncertainty are
considered. In particular, we determine the optimal strategies for the problem of
maximizing the utility of goodwill at launch time and minimizing the disutility of
a stream of advertising costs that extends until the launch time for some classes of
stochastic perturbations of the classical Nerlove-Arrow dynamics. We also consider
some generalizations such as problems with constrained budget and with discre-
tionary launching.
Key Words: optimal advertising under uncertainty, Bellman equation, control with
discretionary stopping.
1 Introduction
We consider the optimization problem faced by a firm that, while advertising a product
prior to its introduction to the market, wants to determine the optimal advertising policy
for the maximization of the product image (also called goodwill), and the minimization of
the total discounted cost. We shall also consider the problem of optimizing the launching
time, thus allowing the firm to decide at its discretion to stop the advertising campaign
and start selling the product.
This type of problems can be traced back at least to Nerlove and Arrow [22], who
proposed to model the stock of advertising goodwill x(t) at time t ≥ 0 as
x˙t = ut − ρxt, x0 = x ≥ 0, (1)
where ut is the rate of advertising expenditure, ρ > 0 is a factor of deterioration of
product image in absence of advertisement. The optimization problem for a firm that
seeks to maximize awareness of its product at a given launch time T > 0 and to minimize
its advertising effort until T could be formulated as a multi-objective program of the
type (
sup
u∈U
E[e−cTϕ(xT )], inf
u∈U
E
[ ∫ T
0
e−cth(ut) dt
])
, (2)
subject to the dynamics (1), where c > 0 is a discount factor, ϕ : R → R is a re-
ward function, h : R → R is a loss function, and U is the set of measurable functions
1
u : [0, T ] → U , with U a closed subset of R+. Following a standard procedure in
multi-objective optimization (see e.g. Zeleny [28]), one takes a weighted average of the
objectives in (2) and obtains the deterministic optimal control problem
sup
u∈U
(
e−cTγ0ϕ(xT )−
∫ T
0
e−cth(ut) dt
)
, (3)
where γ0 is a positive constant. Sufficient conditions for the problem to be well posed are,
e.g., that ϕ is concave and continuous, h is convex and continuous, and U is compact.
The conditions are also meaningful from an economic point of view, as it is customary to
use concave (increasing) utility functions as measures of reward, and convex (increasing)
loss functions. In the simplest case, one could take h(u) = u, so that the second term
in (3) coincides with the total discounted advertising expenditure. This deterministic
optimal control formulation has been extended by many authors to account for delay
effects, non-linearity in the response to advertisement, and many other factors. For a
recent work on the subject, which also contains a list of related references, we refer to
Buratto and Viscolani [7].
On the other hand, less work has been devoted to the case of stochastic evolution of
goodwill level: for a few examples of works in this direction, we refer to the survey by
Feichtinger, Hartl and Sethi [11] and references therein, and to the more recent papers of
Grosset and Viscolani [13] and Buratto and Grosset [6]. The emergence of randomness
in the dynamics of goodwill is quite natural for several reasons: one may think, for
example, that random fluctuations in the goodwill level are the effect of external factors
beyond the control of the firm, or that noise enters through the control, since the effect
of advertising may be partly uncertain (see section 2 for a detailed discussion).
In this work we introduce some stochastic extensions of the classical model of Nerlove
and Arrow and study related optimization problems. We do not aim at maximum
generality, instead we focus on models whose special structure allows us to obtain explicit
solutions. In particular, in section 2 we propose a stochastic extension of the Nerlove-
Arrow dynamics and motivate it by marketing assumptions. We formulate a rather
general problem of optimizing an objective function that weighs (a function of) product
image at a fixed time and the cumulative cost of advertising effort, and we construct a
nearly optimal advertising strategy. The special case of linear reward of goodwill and
linear cost of advertising effort is considered in section 3: the special structure of the
problem allows one to obtain the value function and the optimal policy in closed form,
and to consider more general problems of advertising with a limited budget. In section 4
we study another case where explicit solutions can be obtained, i.e. the case of quadratic
reward of final goodwill and quadratic cost of advertising. Under these assumptions we
also explicitly solve in section 5 a problem of optimal advertising with discretionary
stopping to reach a target level of product awareness. We conclude suggesting some
problems not addressed in this paper.
2 Stochastic models for goodwill dynamics and related op-
timization problems
Let xt be the level of product image at time t, 0 ≤ t ≤ T , where T > 0 is the end of
the planning horizon (the time at which the product will be launched). We postulate
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a dynamics for xt given by the following stochastic differential equation, which is a
stochastic perturbation of the Nerlove-Arrow dynamics (1):
dxt = (−ρxt + ut) dt+ σ(xt, ut) dwt, x0 = x ≥ 0, (4)
where ρ is a positive constant, σ : R2 → R is Lipschitz continuous, and wt is a standard
real valued Brownian motion on a filtered probability space (Ω,F ,F,P), F = (Ft)t∈[0,T ].
The control process ut models the rate of advertising effort by the firm, and is assumed
to be measurable, adapted, and taking values in a closed convex subset U of [0,+∞). We
will denote by U the set of controls satisfying these properties. We use gross rating points
(GRPs) to measure advertising effort, instead of the rate of advertising expenditure,
following a recent trend in the marketing literature – see e.g. Dube and Manchanda [8],
Vilcassim, Kadiyali and Chintagunta [27].
As briefly mentioned in the introduction, there are several reasons to study stochastic
extensions of the Nerlove-Arrow model. Early papers on the subject such as Rao [25]
and Raman [24] advocated the use of stochastic models with the observation that such
effects as copy and competitive changes would render uncertain the effect of advertising
on goodwill. In both papers stochastic perturbations of the Nerlove-Arrow dynamics of
the type (4) were proposed, with σ not depending on xt nor ut.
While a model with only additive noise can be useful as a first approximation, it
is reasonable to consider more general stochastic disturbances, depending also on the
goodwill level xt and on the intensity of advertising effort ut. In particular, one could dis-
tinguish, potentially among others, three sources of uncertainty: a “background noise”,
of additive type, due to the kind of effects indicated by Raman [24] and Rao [25], which
are not directly influenced neither by the popularity of the product nor by the intensity
of advertising. A second contribution to the intensity of noise can be attributed to the
uncertainty in the opinion of the (potential) customers that are aware of the product.
Finally, one should take into account the uncertainty in the effect of advertising. In
order to model explicitly such disturbances, it may be reasonable to assume that the
intensities of the second and third type of noise just mentioned are proportional respec-
tively to the goodwill level xt (a proxy for the number of customers that are aware of
the advertised product) and to the level of advertising effort ut. In particular, the noise
component proportional to the goodwill level could also be interpreted as the effect
of “internal influence” (also called word-of-mouth communication), due to the random
outcome on the goodwill level of the interaction between customers who know the prod-
uct. Similar ideas (and terminology) are extensively employed in the literature on new
product diffusion (see e.g. Bass [2]). The third source of uncertainty described above
could be suggestively justified by attaching to each unit of advertising effort a random
effect, so that, heuristically speaking, “noise enters the system through the control” via
ut 7→ ut(1 + σ2
dwt
dt ).
We would also like to mention that models for the evolution of goodwill expressed
as stochastic perturbations of the Nerlove-Arrow dynamics of the type (4), where the
diffusion coefficient σ depends both on xt and on ut, appeared also as diffusion approx-
imations of models based on discrete-time Markov chains (see e.g. Tapiero [26] and
references therein), and in the above mentioned papers [13], [6].
Due to the lack of empirical studies and of theoretical papers in the marketing
literature on the determinants of uncertainty in the dynamics of goodwill, we are led to
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consider, in the same spirit of the cited works of Raman and Rao, a linear specification
of the diffusion coefficient σ:
σ(x, u) = σ0 + σ1|x|+ σ2u,
where σ0, σ1, σ2 are fixed non-negative constants. In practice, the values of these coef-
ficients should be determined by ad hoc empirical studies and/or by specific managerial
and marketing insights.
A natural analog in the stochastic setting of the general optimization problem (3)
can now be formulated. Let us define the performance functional relative to strategy
u ∈ U as
vu(s, x) = Eus,x
[
e−cTϕ(xT )−
∫ T
0
e−cth(ut) dt
]
, (5)
and the value function as
v(s, x) = sup
u∈U
vu(s, x), (6)
where h : U → R+ is bounded and |ϕ(x)| < K(1 + |x|
m) for some positive constants
K, m. By Eus,x we mean, as usual, expectation with respect to the law of the controlled
diffusion
xt = x+
∫ t
s
(−ρxr + ur) dr +
∫ t
s
(σ0 + σ1|xr|+ σ2ur) dwr, s ≤ r ≤ t ≤ T.
Our objective is to characterize the value function and to find (or approximate) strategies
realizing the supremum in (6). Although the problem is well posed under the given
assumptions, particularly meaningful choices from the economic point of view are ϕ
concave increasing (we have in mind the utility function of a risk-averse agent) and h
convex increasing (typical choice of cost function).
We shall study the problem through the dynamic programming approach, i.e. through
the study of the associated Bellman equation, which can be written as
sup
u∈U
[∂ψ
∂t
+ Luψ − cψ − h(u)
]
= 0, ψ(T, x) = ϕ(x), (7)
where Lu is the differential operator defined by
Lu =
1
2
a(x, u)∂2x + b(x, u)∂x,
with a := σσ∗ = σ2 and b(x, u) = −ρx+ u.
Equation (7) is (under the assumption σ0 6= 0) a fully nonlinear uniformly nonde-
generate parabolic PDE, for which general results about existence of smooth solutions
are available under additional assumptions of smoothness and boundedness of the coef-
ficients and of the reward and loss functions. However, we can prove existence of nearly
optimal control in a general setting that covers also the case σ0 = 0, for which the
Bellman equation (7) becomes degenerate. In particular we have the following result.
Theorem 1 For any ε > 0, s ∈ [0, T ], x ∈ R, there exists a Markov strategy uεt ∈ U
such that v(s, x) ≤ vu
ε
(s, x) + 43ε.
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Proof. We divide the proof in three steps. In the first step we introduce a sequence of
approximating problems, in the second step we construct an optimal feedback control
for each approximating problem. In the last step we prove that optimal controls for the
approximating problems are nearly optimal for the original problem.
Step 1: Let ζn ∈ C
∞
0 (R) with
∫
R
ζn(x) dx = 1, n = 0, 1, 2 . . ., be a sequence of mollifiers.
Define
b˜n(x, u) =


ρn+ u, x < −n
−ρx+ u, −n ≤ x ≤ n
−ρn+ u, x > n
and bn(x, u) = b˜n(x, u) ∗ ζn(x) (convolution with respect to x). Similarly, define
σ˜n(x, u) =


σ0 + σ11/n+ σ2u, |x| < 1/n
σ0 + σ1|x|+ σ2u, 1/n ≤ |x| ≤ n
σ0 + σ1n+ σ2u, |x| > n,
ϕ˜n(x) =


ϕ(−n), x < −n
ϕ(x), −n ≤ x ≤ n
ϕ(n), x > n,
and σn(x, u) = σ˜n(x, u)∗ζn(x), ϕn(x) = ϕ˜n(x)∗ζn(x). Similarly, let hn(x) = h(x)∗ζn(x).
Given a sequence of functions fn(x, u), we shall say that fn(x, u) converges to f(x, u) in
L if for each R > 0 one has
lim
n→∞
sup
u∈U
sup
|x|≤R
|fn(x, u)− f(x, u)| = 0.
By well known properties of convolution with smooth kernels, it is easy to prove that
σn, bn, hn, ϕn belong to C
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b and that they converge to σ, b, h, ϕ, respectively, in L .
Let us denote by xu,s,xt (n) a solution of the equation
xt = x+
∫ t
s
bn(ur, xr) dr +
∫ t
s
σn(ur, xr) dwr,
where u ∈ U, 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T , x ∈ R+. Moreover, let us define
vun(s, x) := E
u
s,x
[
−
∫ T
s
e−crhn(ur) dr + e
−cTϕn(xT (n))
]
(8)
and vn(s, x) = supu∈U v
u
n(s, x).
Step 2: Since σ˜n(x, u) is continuous and σ˜
2
n(x, u) > 0 for all x ∈ R and u ∈ U , by
properties of convolutions with smooth kernels, one also has σ2n(x, u) > 0 uniformly
over x, u for n large enough. Therefore (for a fixed large n) the value function vn is a
C1,2([0, T ] × R) solution of the Bellman equation


sup
u∈U
[
vt(t, x) +
1
2
σ2n(x, u)vxx(t, x) + bn(x, u)vx(t, x)− cv(t, x) − hn(u)
]
= 0
v(T, x) = ϕn(x),
(9)
as it follows from a result of Krylov (see [17], p. 301 and also [12], p. 168). As it is well
known, if the supremum in (9) is attained for each (x, t) by un(x, t), then unt := u
n(xt, t)
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is an optimal Markov strategy for the approximating problem of maximizing (8). See
also [12], p. 169.
Step 3: As it follows by theorem 3.1.12 in [16], we have that vun(t, x) → v
u(t, x) uni-
formly with respect to u ∈ U, s ∈ [0, T ], |x| ≤ R for each R > 0. Therefore, given ε > 0,
there exists N > 0 such that for all n > N one has |vun − v
u| < ε/3 for all u ∈ U. Let us
first prove that |vn − v| < ε. Assume, by contradiction, that vn < v − ε (without loss
of generality, as the case v < vn − ε is completely analogous). By definition of v, there
exists u1 such that |vu
1
− v| < ε/3. From |vu
1
n − v
u1 | < ε/3 we also have
|vu
1
n − v| ≤ |v
u1
n − v
u1 |+ |vu
1
− v| <
2
3
ε,
hence vu
1
n > vn, which is absurd. Then we have proved that |vn − v| < ε. Let us now
take n > N large enough, so that the conditions of step 2 are satisfied, and let uε be a
Markov strategy such that vn = v
uε
n . Then we have, by the triangular inequality,
|vu
ε
− v| ≤ |vu
ε
− vu
ε
n |+ |v
uε
n − v|
<
ε
3
+ ε =
4
3
ε,
which proves the claim. The proof of the theorem is thus finished. 
Under more specific structural assumptions on the objective function to optimize, it
is natural to expect sharper characterizations of the value function and of the optimal
advertising strategy. This is the topic of the following sections.
3 Linear reward and loss functions
In this section we study the simplest case, with linear reward for the level of goodwill at
time T and linear loss function of advertising effort. As discussed before, if we identify
ut with the rate of advertising spending, then the second term in the objective function
(5) can be identified with discounted cumulative advertising costs. Let us specify the
problem in detail. Our aim is to maximize over U the functional
vu(s, x) = Eus,x
[
γ0e
−cTxT −
∫ T
0
e−ctut dt,
]
where
xt = x+
∫ t
s
(−ρxr + ur) dr +
∫ t
s
σ(xr, ur) dwr, s ≤ r ≤ t ≤ T. (10)
In the sequel we shall set, for simplicity, γ = γ0e
−cT . Note that, due to the linearity
on ut of the performance functional, we can explicitly solve the optimization problem
even without specifying the functional form of the diffusion coefficient σ, as long as
(10) admits a solution. In particular, σ could be identically zero, for which we obtain
the classical deterministic Nerlove-Arrow dynamics. The interpretation of this fact is
simply that optimizing a linear objective function as vu simply coincides with controlling
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the “mean evolution” of our stochastic dynamics, for which we can obtain an explicit
expression as follows: first write
xT = e
−ρTx+
∫ T
0
e−ρ(T−t)ut dt+
∫ T
0
e−ρ(T−t)σ(xt, ut) dwt,
then take expectations on both sides to get
E[xT ] = e
−ρTx+
∫ T
0
e−ρ(T−t)E[ut] dt,
where the interchange of the order of integration follows by Fubini’s theorem using the
assumption u ≥ 0. It is now easy to guess that the functional form of σ will not influence
the optimal advertising strategy, which is expected to be of the bang-bang type. This
is made precise in what follows. From the managerial point of view, this means that
the firm, independently of the intensity of the noise and of its dependence on the level
of goodwill and rate of advertising spending, will do its best in terms of maximizing
expected goodwill by simply concentrating all its advertising efforts in a specific period
of the advertising campaign.
Assuming U = [0,m], the Bellman equation associated to the problem of maximizing
vu over U is given by
ψt + sup
u∈[0,m]
(Luψ − e−ctu) = 0, ψ(T, x) = γx. (11)
Note that one has
sup
u∈[0,m]
(Luψ − e−ctu) =
{
−ρxψx +
1
2σ
2ψxx, ψx ≤ e
−ct
−ρxψx +m(ψx − e
−ct) + 12σ
2ψxx, ψx > e
−ct.
Let us consider first the case ψx > e
−ct. Then (11) can be written as
ψt − (ρx−m)ψx +
1
2
σ2ψxx −me
−ct = 0, ψ(T, x) = γx.
We guess a solution of the form ψ(t, x) = γ(t)x+ b1(t), obtaining
xγ′(t) + b′1(t)− (ρx−m)γ(t)−me
−ct = 0,
with terminal conditions γ(T ) = γ, b1(T ) = 0. Then this equation splits into
γ′(t)− ργ(t) = 0, γ(T ) = γ,
with solution γ(t) = γe−ρ(T−t), and
b′1(t) = −mγ(t) +me
−ct, b1(T ) = 0,
with solution
b1(t) = −
mγ
ρ
(1− e−ρ(T−t)) +
m
c
(e−cT − e−ct).
The case ψx ≤ e
−ct is completely similar: let t∗ be the solution of the equation γ(t) =
e−ct, i.e. t∗ =
ρT−log γ
ρ+c . Let us now solve the equation
ψt − ρxψx +
1
2
σ2ψxx = 0, ψ(t∗, x) = γ(t∗)x+ b1(t∗),
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where the terminal condition is such that a global solution of (11) equation is at least
continuous. It is immediate that the solution of this equation is ψ(t, x) = γ(t)x+ b1(t∗),
so that the global solution of (11) is ψ(t, x) = γ(t)x + b(t), where b(t) = b1(t∗) for
γ(t) ≤ e−ct, and b(t) = b1(t) for γ(t) > e
−ct. It is also easy to see that b is continuously
differentiable on (0, T ). In fact, one only needs to check whether there is smooth fit
at t∗. But since b
′
1(t) = −mγ(t) + me
−ct, by definition of t∗ it immediately follows
b′1(t∗) = 0. This also proves that ψ ∈ C
1,2([0, T ],R), hence the solution of the Bellman
equation (11) is the value function of the corresponding control problem, and we can
conclude that the optimal control is given by the following bang-bang policy:
u∗(t) =
{
0 t ≤ t∗,
m t > t∗.
(12)
That is, it is optimal not to advertise until a certain point in time t∗, after which it
becomes optimal to advertise at the maximum rate. Note that, depending on γ, it could
well be that t∗ > T , i.e. it would never be optimal to advertise. This situation arises
if the reward for improving the image of a product is small compared to the value of
resources spent on advertisement.
We collect the findings of this section in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 The optimal control problem of maximizing vu(0, x) is solved by a con-
trol of the type (12), with t∗ =
ρT−log γ
ρ+c , and the corresponding value function is given
by v(t, x) = γ(t)x+ b(t), where
b(t) =
{
b1(t∗) t ≤ t∗,
b1(t) t > t∗.
Using a Lagrange multiplier method, we can treat the related problem of maximizing
the level of goodwill at time T with a certain available budget for advertising. More
precisely, let us consider the constrained stochastic control problem
sup
u∈M
E[xT ], (13)
where M ⊂ U is the set of admissible controls u(·) ∈ [0,m] satisfying the integral
constraint
E
[∫ T
0
e−ctut dt
]
≤M,
where M is a fixed positive constant. In order for the constrained problem to be non-
trivial, it is also necessary to assume that M ≤ m
∫ T
0 e
−ct dt. We actually only need
to consider controls u for which the constraint is binding, i.e. advertising policies that
use the whole budget M . In fact, denoting by xuT the controlled goodwill at time T , it
is clear that u1 ≥ u2 implies E[x
u1
T ] ≥ E[x
u2
T ], so it is never optimal to leave resources
unused.
Let us introduce a Lagrange multiplier λ > 0, and consider the (unconstrained)
problem
sup
u∈[0,m]
E
[
xT − λ
(∫ T
0
e−ctut dt−M
)]
. (14)
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Then one has
sup
u∈M
E[xT ] = sup
u∈M
E
[
xT − λ
(∫ T
0
e−ctut dt−M
)]
≤ sup
u∈U
E
[
xT − λ
(∫ T
0
e−ctut dt−M
)]
,
where the first equality comes from the above observation that we only need consider
controls that use the whole budget M , and the second inequality is justified byM⊆ U.
If the unconstrained problem (14) admits a solution uλ for all λ > 0, and a λ∗ exists such
that E
∫ T
0 e
−ctuλ∗(t) dt−M = 0, then u∗ := uλ∗ is an optimal control for the constrained
problem. So we proceed to solve
sup
u∈U
E
[
1
λ
xT −
∫ T
0
e−ctut dt
]
,
whose solution is
γ(t) ≤ e−ct ⇒ u∗(t) = 0,
γ(t) > e−ct ⇒ u∗(t) = m,
with γ(t) =
1
λ
e−ρ(T−t).
The starting point for advertisement t∗ is given by the solution of the equation
γ(t) = e−ct, so that
t∗ =
ρT + log λ
ρ+ c
. (15)
We now need to show that λ > 0 exists such that
∫ T
t∗
me−ct dt =M. (16)
The solution of such an equation is given by
λ∗ = e
ρT
(
c
M
m
+ e−cT
)− ρ+c
c
,
which is clearly positive. It is now clear how to associate to such a λ∗ the optimal
solution for the constrained problem. Namely, given λ∗ we obtain the optimal switching
time t∗ by (15), and hence the optimal control as u∗(t) = mχ{t>t∗}, where χ is the
indicator function.
We have then proved the following result.
Proposition 3 The optimal advertising policy for the constrained maximization of good-
will (13) is given by
u∗(t) =
{
0 t ≤ t∗,
m t > t∗,
with
t∗ =
2ρ
ρ+ c
T −
1
c
(e−cT + cM/m).
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Remark 4 It follows from (16) that the time to start advertising is given by
e−ct∗ − e−cT = c
M
m
,
and therefore we cannot simply consider unbounded controls with cumulative discounted
cost less or equal than M , otherwise the optimal policy would be to “do infinite adver-
tising at time T”.
4 Quadratic reward and loss functions
In this section we assume that both ϕ and h are quadratic. In particular, we assume
ϕ(x) = γ0x
2, with γ0 > 0, and h(x) = x
2. That is, we consider the problem of charac-
terizing
v(s, x) = sup
u∈U
E
u
s,x
[
γx2T −
∫ T
0
e−ctu2t dt
]
,
or, equivalently,
v(s, x) = inf
u∈U
E
u
s,x
[ ∫ T
0
e−ctu2t dt− γx
2
T
]
, (17)
where we set γ = e−cTγ0, xt follows the controlled dynamics
xt = x+
∫ t
s
(−ρxr + ur) dr +
∫ t
s
(σ1xr + σ2ur) dwr,
and U is the set of adapted, nonnegative, square integrable controls. A peculiar feature
of the problem is that, while the choice of the cost function h is rather standard (see
e.g. Muller [21]), the reward function ϕ is convex, hence representative of a risk-seeking
firm. Such attitude toward risk could be justified, for instance, by the attempt to profit
from the fluctuations of the goodwill level at time T (in fact, note that, grossly speaking,
the firm aims at maximizing both the mean and the variance of xT ). Another peculiar
feature of ϕ(x) = x2 is that it equally rewards positive and negative goodwill levels at
time T . However, we shall show that under our assumptions xt ≥ 0 almost surely, hence
the symmetry of ϕ is harmless.
In this section we assume that the intensity of the “background noise” is negligible, so
that we can assume σ0 = 0. This assumption is essential in order to obtain (meaningful)
solutions in closed form.
The problem at hand is a linear quadratic regulator problem with indefinite costs,
which can be solved by the methods of Ait Rami, Moore and Zhou [1] (see also Krylov
[18]). In particular, the generalized Riccati equation for this problem is


P˙ = (2ρ− σ21)P + (1 + σ1σ2)
2 P
2
e−ct + σ22P
,
e−ct + σ22P > 0
P (T ) = −γ.
(18)
Recall that one says that (17) is well posed at s if v(s, x) > −∞. By [1], well-posedeness
of (17) at s = 0 is necessary for the global solvability of (18). Under the assumption
10
e−cT − σ22γ > 0, one can only ensure that the problem is locally well posed, i.e. that
there exists t0 < T such that the Riccati equation (18) admits a solution in [t0, T ]. The
following proposition gives explicit sufficient conditions on the data of the problem such
that (18) admits a unique global solution on [0, T ].
Proposition 5 Let us define
a1 = −2ρ− 2σ1σ
−1
2 − σ
−2
2 < 0
a2 = 2ρ+ σ
2
1 + 2σ
−2
2 + 4σ1σ
−1
2 > 0
a3 = −(σ1 + σ
−1
2 )
2 < 0
a4 = −γ0σ
2
2 + 1 > 0
ζ = a22 − 4a1a3 = 4ρ
2 + σ41 − 4ρσ
2
1 ,
where the inequality a4 > 0 is taken as an assumption. Then the following hold:
(i) If ζ > 0 and a2 > (2|a1|a4 − ζ
1/2)+, then the problem is well posed.
(ii) If ζ > 0 and a2 ≤ (2|a1|a4 − ζ
1/2)+, then the problem is well posed if and only if
T ≤ ζ−1/2
(
ξ1 log
ξ1
ξ1 − a4
− ξ2 log
ξ2
ξ2 − a4
)
,
where ξ1,2 = (−a2 ± ζ
1/2)/(2a1).
(iii) If ζ = 0 and a2 > 2|a1|a4, then the problem is well posed.
(iv) If ζ = 0 and a2 ≤ 2|a1|a4, then the problem is well posed if and only if
T ≤ a−11
(
log
a2
2a1a4 + a2
+
2a1a4
2a1a4 + a2
)
(v) If ζ < 0, then the problem is well posed if and only if
T ≤ (2a1)
−1
(
log a3
a1a24+a2a4+a3
− 2a2ζ
−1/2
(
atan a2ζ
−1/2 − atan ζ−1/2(2a1a4 + a2)
))
Proof. We shall divide the proof in three steps. In the first step we introduce an
auxiliary LQ problem whose well-posedness is sufficient for the well-posedness of (17).
In the second step we rescale the auxiliary LQ problem, and in the third and last step
we study the global solvability of its associated Riccati equation.
Step 1: Let us prove that if
inf
u∈U
E
[∫ T
0
u2t dt− γ0x
2
T
]
> −∞, (19)
then (17) is well posed. In fact, suppose, by contradiction, that there exists a sequence
u(k) ∈ U such that
E
u(k)
[∫ T
0
e−ctut(k)
2 dt− γx2T
]
→ −∞.
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Then one also has
e−cTEu(k)
[∫ T
0
ut(k)
2 dt− γ0x
2
T
]
≤ Eu(k)
[∫ T
0
e−ctut(k)
2 dt− γx2T
]
→ −∞,
which contradicts (19), hence our claim is proved.
Step 2: Let us define x˜t = σ
−1
2 xt. Then the minimization problem in (19) is equivalent
to
inf
u∈U
E
[∫ T
0
u2t dt− γ0σ
2
2x˜
2
T
]
(20)
subject to
x˜t = σ
−1
2 x+
∫ t
0
(−ρx˜s + σ
−1
2 us) ds+
∫ t
0
(σ1x˜s + us) dws.
Step 3: The Riccati equation for problem (20) is


P˙ = (2ρ− σ21)P +
(σ1 + σ
−1
2 )
2P 2
P + 1
P (T ) = −γ0σ
2
2
P (t) + 1 > 0,
which can be rewritten, after the change of variable pi(t) = P (T − t) + 1, as


p˙i = a1pi + a2 + a3pi
−1
pi(0) = a4
pi(t) > 0.
(21)
All assertions (i)-(v) are proved simply by determining the first time t0 for which pi(t0) =
0. Since the method of proof is the same for all cases, we shall show in detail only cases
(i)-(ii). In particular, assuming ζ > 0, then a1pi
2 + a2pi + a3 = 0 has two roots ξ1 < ξ2,
and the reduced Riccati equation (21) as
p˙i = a1pi
−1(pi − ξ1)(pi − ξ2).
Note that a1 < 0 implies ξ1ξ2 = a3/a1 > 0. Moreover one has ξ1 + ξ2 = a2/|a1|, and,
by a2 > 0, 0 < ξ1 < ξ2. Therefore t0 < ∞ if and only if a4 < ξ1 =
−a2−ζ1/2
2a1
, which can
be rewritten as a2 > (2|a1|a4 − ζ
1/2)+. In order to determine t0 such that pi(t0) = 0, we
shall solve (21) explicitly: for this purpose, note that one has
pi
(pi − ξ1)(pi − ξ2)
=
A
pi − ξ1
+
B
pi − ξ2
,
with A = − ξ1ξ2−ξ1 and B =
ξ2
ξ2−ξ1
, hence (21) can also be written as
A
p˙i
pi − ξ1
+B
p˙i
pi − ξ2
= a1.
Integrating one gets
−ξ1
∫ t
0
p˙i(s)
pi(s)− ξ1
ds+ ξ2
∫ t
0
p˙i(s)
pi(s)− ξ2
= a1(ξ2 − ξ1)t,
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and finally
−ξ1 log
pi(t)− ξ1
pi(0) − ξ1
+ ξ2 log
pi(t)− ξ2
pi(0)− ξ2
= a1(ξ2 − ξ1)t.
Solving for t0 such that pi(t0) = 0, recalling that a1(ξ2 − ξ1) = ζ
1/2, gives the required
result. 
Assuming that the problem is well posed, the results in [1] imply that the optimal
control strategy is unique and is given by the Markov policy
u0t = u
0(xt) = −
(1 + σ1σ2)P (t)
e−ct + σ22P (t)
xt, (22)
with associated value function v(s, x) = P (s)x2. The optimal trajectory is then given
by the closed-loop equation
dxt = a(t)xt dt+ c(t)xt dwt,
with
a(t) := −ρ−
(1 + σ1σ2)P (t)
e−ct + σ22P (t)
,
c(t) := σ1 + σ2
(1 + σ1σ2)P (t)
e−ct + σ22P (t)
,
which admits the explicit solution
xt = x exp
(∫ t
0
(a(s)−
1
2
c(s)2) ds +
∫ t
0
c(s) dws
)
. (23)
In particular, if x > 0, then xt is a.s. positive for all t ∈ [0, T ]. If we can prove that
P (t) < 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ], then (22) will imply that the optimal strategy u0t is positive
for all t ∈ [0, T ]. The negativity of P is proved in the following lemma.
Lemma 6 If P solves the Riccati equation (18) on [s, T ], then P (t) < 0 for all t ∈ [s, T ].
Proof. Assume, by contradiction, that there exists t0 ∈ [s, T [ such that P (t0) = 0. Then
P (t) ≡ 0 is a continuous solution of (18) for t > t0. By uniqueness of the solution of (18)
(see [1]) it follows that this is also the only solution. But this contradicts the terminal
condition P (T ) = −γ 6= 0. 
We have thus proved all claims on the optimal state and control.
Remarks. (i) It is worth noting that several sensitivities of the value function and
of the expected optimal goodwill with respect to initial data or parameters could be
computed as well in terms of the solution of the Riccati equation (18).
(ii) If the intensity of the noise carried by the advertising is also negligible, i.e.
we can assume σ2 = 0, then the Riccati equation (18) is explicitly solvable, and the
corresponding calculations mentioned in the previous remark simplify even more. More
details can be found in [19].
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(iii) The linear-quadratic regulator approach is also useful if one wants to consider
problems with partial observation, which are meaningful in our setting, as goodwill can
hardly be measured without error. Suppose instead that we can observe a “noisy proxy”
of goodwill zt specified by {
dzt = hxt dt+ g dw
1
t
z0 = 0,
(24)
with h and g constants, and w1 a Brownian motion independent of w. Then one is
interested to solve problem (17), where U is now the set of nonnegative square integrable
controls adapted to the filtration generated by zt, instead of xt. Thanks to the so called
separation principle (see e.g. Bensoussan [4]), this problem reduces to linear filtering
and deterministic control on the filtered dynamics. More details will be given elsewhere.
5 Optimal advertising to meet a goal with discretionary
stopping
Problems of mixed optimal stopping and control have recently attracted attention in
works of applied probability, see for instance Karatzas and Wang [15] for applications
to portfolio optimization, Duckworth and Zervos [9], [10] and Zervos [29] for problems
of investment decisions with strategic entry and exit, and Karatzas, Ocone, Wang and
Zervos [14] for a singular control problem with finite fuel. For the theory, see, e.g.,
Krylov [16], Bensoussan and Lions [5], Øksendal and Sulem [23], and Morimoto [20].
One of the first works addressing the issue of finding explicit results was Benesˇ [3].
In this section we find an explicit representation for the optimal control and the
optimal stopping strategy for the case of minimizing an objective function that is the
sum of the quadratic distance of the goodwill from a target at the (discretionary) launch
time τ and of the cumulative quadratic cost until τ , assuming that the goodwill dynamics
is of Ornstein-Uhlenbeck type. For simplicity we also assume c = 0, i.e. we consider
the case without discounting. In order to discourage long waiting before launching the
product, we also introduce an extra term in the objective function depending on the
time of launching.
Let yt = k − xt be the distance of the goodwill level at time t from a desired target
k. We shall find the solution to the problem
inf
u∈U,τ∈S
E
u,τ
0,x
[
y2(τ) + γ1
∫ τ
0
u2(t) dt+ γ2τ
]
=: v(x), (25)
where y is such that
dyt = (µ− ρyt + ut) dt+ dwt,
with µ := ρk and we have assumed, without loss of generality (in the setting of constant
σ), σ = 1. Let F be the filtration generated by w. Then U is the space of F-adapted
square integrable control processes, and S is the set of all F-stopping times.
Note that the first term in (25) assigns equal costs to the events that the target
is not reached (from below) and that it is exceeded. Our setting could be considered
as a stylized model for the situation when a firm is launching a new product in a
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predetermined quantity (the target k) and considers equally undesirable to undersell
the product (xt < k) or to leave demand unmet (xt > k).
The quasi-variational inequality associated to the mixed problem of optimal control
and optimal stopping (25) can be written as
min
x
(
x2 − v(x),min
u
(Luv + γ1u
2 + γ2)
)
= 0,
where Lu is the generator of the controlled diffusion y, i.e. Lu is the differential operator
defined by
Luf(x) =
1
2
f ′′(x) + (µ− ρx− u)f ′(x).
We guess a continuation region D of the type D = {x : x ≥ x0}, where one must have
min
u
(Luv + γ1u
2 + γ2) = 0.
We have
min
u
(Luv + γ1u
2 + γ2) = Av −
1
4γ1
v2x + γ2,
where A is the generator of the uncontrolled diffusion, i.e.
Af(x) =
1
2
f ′′(x) + (µ− ρx)f ′(x).
Then we get
Av −
1
4γ1
v2x + γ2 = 0, x ≥ x0
In order to linearize this ODE, we apply the Hopf-Cole transformation U(x) = e
1
2γ1
v(x)
,
obtaining
1
2
Uxx + (µ− ρx)Ux −
γ2
2γ1
U = 0, x ≥ x0
In order to obtain solutions that are ordinary functions, we restrict ourselves to the
special case γ22γ1 = ρ. However, one can solve the linear equation for U without this
assumption, obtaining solutions that can be expressed in terms of special functions.
Two linearly independent solutions are
U1(x) = e
−2µx+ρx2 , U2(x) = e
ρ(x−µ/ρ)2
∫ ∞
x
e−ρ(s−µ/ρ)
2
ds
Then the general solution can be written as U = α1U1+α2U2, with α1 and α2 arbitrary
real constants.
Guided by the observation that U1 is unbounded in the continuation region, we set
α1 = 0, and impose C
1 fit of U(x) = α2U2(x) to the Hopf-Cole transformation of x
2 at
the point x0, that is
U(x0) = e
− 1
2γ1
x20
U ′(x0) = −
x0
γ1
e
− 1
2γ1
x20 .
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We solve now the following system of equations for the unknowns α2 and x0:
α2e
ρ(x0−µ/ρ)2
∫ ∞
x
e−ρ(s−µ/ρ)
2
ds = e
− 1
2γ1
x2
0
α2
[
2ρ(x0 −
µ
ρ
)eρ(x0−µ/ρ)
2
∫ ∞
x0
e−ρ(s−µ/ρ)
2
ds− 1
]
= −
x0
γ1
e
− 1
2γ1
x20 .
Therefore x0 is given by the solution of the following equation
((2ρ+
1
γ1
)x− 2µ)eρ(x−µ/ρ)
2
∫ ∞
x
e−ρ(s−µ/ρ)
2
ds = 1.
In fact the solution, if it exists, is unique, because the left hand side, as a function of
x, is increasing. Now one can also find α2 in terms of x0, so that we have a candidate
continuation region (or equivalently an optimal stopping region), and a candidate value
function.
We need to show that Av(x)− 14γ1 (v
′(x))2+γ2 ≥ 0 in the region x ≤ x0, for v(x) = x
2.
That is, we want to show that
(2ρ+
1
γ1
)x2 − 2µx− (1 + γ2) ≤ 0. (26)
The expression on the left hand side takes its maximum either at x = 0 or at x = x0.
Therefore, if xmax = 0, condition (26) is trivially verified. Otherwise, if xmax = x0, we
have
1
(2ρ+ γ−11 )x0 − 2µ
= U2(x0) ≥
1
ρy0 +
√
ρ2y20 + 2ρ
,
where y0 := x0 −
µ
ρ , and the inequality follows by standard estimates on the error
function. Therefore we get
(2ρ+ γ−11 )x0 − 2µ ≤ ρy0 +
√
ρ2y20 + 2ρ.
After some algebraic manipulations, one finds
(2ρ+
1
γ1
)x20 − 2µ
1
γ1
x0 ≤ 2ργ1 = γ2.
Therefore, (26) is verified if, e.g., γ1 > 1. We shall assume that in the following, but
note that this condition can be weakened.
Finally, we need to prove that v(x) ≥ x2 in the continuation region x ≥ x0, or
equivalently that U(x) ≥ e
− 1
2γ1
x2
for x ≥ x0. In order to prove this, let us consider their
ratio f(x) = U(x)e
1
2γ1
x2
and prove that it is increasing. One has
f ′(x) = α2e
1
2γ1
x2
(
((2ρ+
1
γ1
)x− 2µ)U2(x)− 1
)
,
and since we have that ((2ρ + 1γ1 )x − 2µ)U2(x) is increasing in x and ((2ρ +
1
γ1
)x0 −
2µ)U2(x) = 1, it follows ((2ρ +
1
γ1
)x − 2µ)U2(x) > 1 for x ≥ x0. Therefore we have
verified all conditions for optimality, and we summarize our findings in the following
proposition.
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Proposition 7 The optimal control policy u∗ and optimal stopping time τ∗ for the prob-
lem (25), with γ1 > 1 and
γ2
2γ1
= ρ, are given by
u∗(yt) = argmin
u
(Luv(yt) + γ1u
2 + γ2) =
v′(yt)
2γ1
and
τ∗ = inf{t ≥ 0 : yt ≤ x0}.
6 Further problems
The optimal control problems studied in this paper are limited to the case of “smooth”
disturbances, that is, the driving noise process has continuous paths. It is meaningful
to relax this assumption and consider also jump components in the noise, to take into
account possible shocks to the image of the advertised product, due, for instance, to bad
news on the product itself or similar ones, or to the introduction of superior technologies.
One could also try to study different type of controls, namely impulse controls, or
even combinations of classical and impulse controls. This is particularly meaningful for
our problems, since impulse controls correspond to the so-called “pulsing advertising”
policies that have been studied in the management and marketing literature (see [11]
and references therein).
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